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Abstract
Objectives: This paper examines and discusses the effects of experience rating on the flow
into disability insurance in the Netherlands. A special focus is given to the distinction
between (and importance of) anticipated and unanticipated effects of experience rating. 
Methods: We use longitudinal administrative firm data from the Dutch social benefit
administration. The data set covers employers from 2000 to 2002. To estimate the
anticipated effects of experience rating, We take advantage of the fact that the premium-
setting system was incomplete – that is, there is no (further) incentive to reduce disability
insurance costs if a maximum premium is reached. Unanticipated effects are uncovered by
comparing employers that are hit by premium increases (ie the ‘treatment’ group) with
those who are not (ie the control group), while controlling for employer fixed effects. 
Results: There is only weak evidence for the effects of anticipated incentives. This contrasts
with substantial findings on the unanticipated impact of experience rating. 
Conclusions: It appears that the decision of employers to increase preventive activities is
mainly an issue of being aware of the experience-rating incentive. When taking a broader
perspective, however, evidence suggests that the enhanced incentives have also led to an
increased flow into unemployment insurance and other benefit schemes.   
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Introduction
At present, the Netherlands stands out as a country with relatively high disability insurance
(DI) experience-rating incentives. On average, about 40 per cent of DI costs was experience-
rated in 2010.1 For this scheme, employers bear the costs of wage continuation during sickness
for two years, together with the first 10 years of the DI benefit.
When the DI experience-rating plan started in 1998, with a time window of five years of DI
benefit expenditures, it did not cause substantial controversy among employers and policy-
makers. Criticism about the scheme arose, however, when there was a rapid increase in the
number of employers who were confronted with substantial increases in their premiums. Each
year, a new cohort of disability benefit costs was added to the disability premium, causing the
rate of experience-rated DI costs to rise until 2003. The incentives became stronger in 2006,
when a major DI reform took place, with the time window of DI experience-rating being
extended from five to 10 years of DI benefit for workers with partial and temporary
disabilities. At the same time, however, the newly introduced DI scheme for the much smaller
group of workers who were permanently fully disabled was not experience-rated at all.
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Experience-rating follows from the principle that employers may be given discretion as to
their prevention and reintegration activities, provided that the corresponding costs are not
imposed on other agents. Without the incentives of experience rating, one may expect the DI
scheme to be over-used. When looking at the literature on workers’ compensation, however,
there is only moderate evidence that experience rating reduces the incidence of work
injuries.2,3,4 In particular, firms may engage in claims management practices and concentrate
on preventing less severe injuries only. In addition, there is no compelling evidence on the
effects of different degrees of experience rating.2
With most of the studies in the literature focusing on workers’ compensation in the USA and
Canada, it is interesting to investigate the effects of experience-rating incentives in the
Netherlands. In light of the broad and generous set-up of the DI scheme, the case for
experience rating to combat moral hazard problems may be stronger for the Netherlands. In
particular, there is strong evidence that the DI scheme had been used in the past by
employers as an exit route for redundant workers.5,6 For workers, benefit levels for both the
sickness scheme (ie full wage payments) and the disability insurance scheme (70 per cent of
last earned wage) remained generous until 2004. In 1996, the sick pay scheme was privatised
in the sense that employers were mandated to cover sickness benefits for 12 months at most.
This self-insurance period was extended to 24 months in 2004. Moreover, DI experience
rating at the level of the individual firm was introduced in 1998. As a consequence,
employer incentives to reduce benefit costs were substantial. Because of the generosity of the
schemes, there was a large potential to reduce the use of the schemes, both by sickness
prevention and reintegration from sickness prior to the DI claim assessment.
This paper examines the effects of experience rating on the flow into disability insurance in
the Netherlands, using a unique longitudinal administrative data set from the Dutch social
benefit administration. The data set covers employers for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002.
The data for these years cover about 370,000 firms, employing roughly 6 million insured
workers (about 75 per cent of the working population in the Netherlands). For each firm,
we observe firm-specific characteristics, some variables on the worker composition, as well
as information on disability cohorts, the disability risk and the experience-rated premium. 
In our analysis, we focus specifically on the distinction between the anticipated and
unanticipated effects of experience rating. Anticipated incentives arise when employers are
aware of the experience-rating incentive system and try to prevent future flow into the
scheme by promoting the health and safety of their workers, and preventing the loss of their
employability. Within the context of our analysis, the identification of anticipated effects of
experience rating follows from the comparison between firms with ‘complete’ incentives and
those with ‘incomplete’ incentives. In particular, the marginal incentive to limit the flow into
disability insurance is zero (or incomplete) if a maximum premium is reached. Anticipated
incentives are effective when employers are fully aware of the experience-rating scheme; they
know that, at the margin, their preventive efforts are likely to result in lower premium rates. 
When addressing the unanticipated effects of experience rating, we review the findings of
earlier research with the same data.7 In essence, unanticipated experience-rating effects result
from a lack of awareness on the part of employers. Unanticipated premium increases may
trigger employers to increase preventive activities. In particular, from the perspective of
smaller firms, the experience-rating system is complex and seemingly unimportant – as long
as there is no flow into disability insurance. This corresponds with earlier analyses on
workers’ compensation which stresses that there is little awareness of experience rating
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among individual firms.3 It is argued that administrative time delays, as well as the
complexity of the premium calculation system, reduce the (potential) incentive impact of
experience rating.8 These findings may also have been relevant for the first years of the
experience-rating system in the Netherlands.
This paper proceeds by describing the Dutch DI system, with particular attention on the
experience-rating premium system that was effective from 1998 to 2002 – the time period
under consideration in the empirical analysis – and still is effective for the partial and
temporarily fully DI scheme today (but with a longer time window). Following a brief
discussion of relevant data, we present our empirical strategies to detect the anticipated and
unanticipated effects of experience-rating, as well as the respective estimation results. We
conclude with a discussion of these results. 
Disability insurance in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the provision of DI is mandatory and financed by pay-as-you-go
contribution rates. In principle, the programme covers all workers against all incomes losses
that result from both occupational and non-occupational injuries. As a result, the system is
different from US workers’ compensation schemes that cover occupational injuries only.9,10
Combined with the public monopoly provision of DI, this makes the disability determination
system rather susceptible to moral hazard problems – that is, for both employers and
workers, the scheme may be an attractive alternative pathway into unemployment.5,6 Moral
hazard problems are aggravated by the generosity of the DI system, which is based on the
individual earnings capacity. This means that disability is measured as a percentage of one’s
earning capacity, rather than an all-or-nothing condition. The residual capacity is defined by
the earnings flowing from any job commensurate with one’s residual capacity as a
percentage of pre-disability (covered) earnings.* Earnings are measured without taking into
account the former occupation or skills of the worker, or their employment conditions at the
time of the assessment. The degree of disability is the complement of the residual earning
capacity. Such a definition allows for a continuous scale on which to measure earnings loss,
and a corresponding scale of compensation. 
Over the years, the Dutch DI programme has repeatedly been subject of public debate. This
is not surprising, as the DI enrolment and DI use in the Netherlands has remained high and
persistent (see Figure 1). Expressed as a percentage of the insured population, DI beneficiary
volume peaked at 16 per cent in the mid-1980s, then declined and stabilised at about 13 per
cent until 2001. After 2001, we observe a dramatic decline in the DI inflow and DI stock.
Note that about one-third of the drop in yearly DI inflow – from about 100,000 workers in
2001 to about 40,000 workers in 2010 – was due to an extension of the sickness benefit
period from one to two years in 2004. The decline in DI inflow was caused by a reduction in
sickness rates, which in turn was caused by increased return-to-work rates of workers.11,12
From the mid-1990s, various reform plans were introduced to increase employer incentives.
As mentioned earlier, the sickness benefit programme was privatised in 1996, making
employers fully responsible for these costs. In 1998, employers’ incentives were enhanced by
the system of DI experience rating. Moreover, in 2002, the (potential) impact of incentives
was further extended by a more stringent system of gate-keeping (there were very few
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* The Dutch statutory minimum wage impacts on the DI benefits of workers with low wages. Such workers
either get a low benefit percentage if their earnings are still higher than or equal to the minimum wage, or a
full DI benefit if their earnings capacity is lower than the minimum wage. 
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employer obligations prior to 2002), and an extension of the sickness benefit period. In
order to be eligible for a medical DI assessment, both workers and employers have to meet
several conditions, so as to convince the benefit administration that disability was
unavoidable. The most recent change in the Dutch DI system entailed the start of two
different types of benefit in 2006: the IVA (Inkomensvoorziening Volledig
Arbeidsongeschikten) benefit for full and permanent disability, and the WGA
(Werkhervatting Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsgeschikten) benefit for partial or temporary full
disability. A claimant is awarded an IVA benefit if the capacity loss expressed in earnings is
80 per cent or more and when there is no potential for any degree of recovery. An IVA
benefit is 75 per cent of previous gross earnings. A worker is awarded a WGA benefit if
their loss of capacity is between 35 per cent and 80 per cent, or more than 80 per cent but
with the prospect of recovery. Thus, the WGA benefit applies to workers who are partially
disabled as well as those who are temporarily fully disabled. For workers with a capacity
loss of less than 35 per cent, there is no (public) DI scheme – employers bear the costs of
production losses that come with this, but in practice these workers also may have a higher
risk of being laid off. 
As we explained earlier, in 2006 the experience-rating incentive was increased for the WGA
benefit, while it ended for the IVA benefit. In effect, it seems that the overall incentive of
experience rating has not changed substantially as a result of these modifications.
Simulation studies suggest that only about one-third of decreases in DI enrolment since
2006 was due to the introduction of the WIA, while the rest can be attributed to effects of
the extension of the sickness benefit period, the new gate-keeping system, and the
experience-rating system that started in 1998.12 All these measures affected the flow into the
DI system, causing the total stock of DI benefit recipients to fall as well. As to the
experience-rating incentives, the outcomes suggest that most gains in the flow into disability
insurance were made in the sickness benefit period. Thus, employers were induced to
prevent workers from exhausting their sickness benefits, thereby avoiding DI claims to
come.
Experience rating and data set-up 
The calculation of the experience-rated DI premium of employers in the Netherlands entails
the determination of the disability costs percentage and – subsequently – the disability
premium.13 In the time period under investigation, the employer disability cost percentage
(dt) at time t equalled the benefit costs of the five most recent DI worker cohorts that
worked for the employer; premiums that are set for the other cohorts are set equal to
sectoral averages. These costs were divided by the average wage sum of the employer over a
five-year time window.* Both the nominator and the denominator are registered with a
delay of two years:
(1)
where Sa,b are the disability costs of an employer in year a for recipients who entered into the
programme at time b (with  a ≥ b), and Wa the insured wage sum at time a. T = 4, as we have
* New firms have a time window that is obviously too short to calculate the DI premium in a standard way.
Therefore, equation (1) has to be rescaled to T = 0. For each additional year, T increases by 1, up to a
maximum of T = 4. 
T
i2
s=0
32=∑
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a five-year time window. Averaging the wage sums over a time window of five years
diminishes the effect of the volatility in wage sums. This way of smoothing also results in
some cross-subsidisation of the experience-rating system: when multiplying the disability cost
percentage with the current wage sum, employers with high wage sum growth rates will pay
more than their disability costs, and downsizing firms less than that. In some cases, the
information that is needed to calculate the disability risk may be incomplete, eg if employers
have started their businesses recently, or when for some period there are no workers at a
particular firm. This means that the disability risk has to be calculated over fewer than five
years, and subsequently rescaled to a five-year period.
The calculation of the employer DI premiums is based on the employer disability cost
percentage, using the following algorithm:
pt =  min (pmin +  dt , pmax) (2)
where pt is the premium rate over the wage sum, and pmin and pmax the minimum and
maximum premiums – indicating the range over which pt may vary. Equation (2) shows that
the experience-rating system is ‘incomplete’: higher disability costs result in proportionate
increases in the DI premium up to pmax, but over-users do not pay the additional costs they
impose on their system.* This contrasts with the US system, where there risks below a certain
threshold do not translate into higher premiums. The minimum premium is a uniform
premium that is paid by all employers (also for dt = 0). The values for both pmin and pmax
vary with respect to firm size, the argument being that small firms are more susceptible to
(exogenous) variation in their DI cost percentage. In particular, small firms are defined as
those with a wage sum that is smaller than the average wage sum per worker in the
Netherlands, multiplied by 15 (workers).† Using an iterative algorithm, minimum premiums
are set at the level that balances the total disability costs with the collected premiums.‡ Small
firms are more likely to pay the maximum premium, as the actual spread of disability risks is
higher for this group. Consequently, higher minimum premiums are needed for this group to
finance firms that are paying the maximum premium.
Employers receive a separate specification when they have individual disability costs, causing
the premium to exceed the minimum. In practice, the variation in premium rate increases that
is due to individual disability costs is far more substantial than the variation in the minimum
premium.7 Moreover, it is far more likely that the separate notification will catch the attention
of employers, rather than the standard social benefit specification that, next to unemployment
* Experience-rating systems may also be incomplete at the lower boundary of the disability cost distribution,
instead of the upper boundary only. The experience-rating incentive then becomes effective from the point that
disability costs exceed a certain minimum.
† In particular, if the wage sum of an employer exceeds 15 times the average wage sum across all employers, then
pmin is set lower, and pmax higher, thus extending the support of premiums. For these employers, the maximum
premium is set equal at four times the average premium, whereas for small firms it is three times the average
premium. Note that there is no (further) variation in minimum and maximum premium rates between sectors.
‡ Note that minimum premiums are needed to finance the DI costs over employers paying the maximum
premium. Moreover, minimum premium revenues are needed to finance the disability costs of firms that have
gone bankrupt, or to make up past reserve deficits.
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insurance information, (only) includes information on the minimum premium. It also should
be noted that there was no public campaign to inform employers on the experience-rating
plan. This renders it likely that awareness of the system was low in the first years.
Nearly all the administrative information that is needed for the calculation of disability cost
percentages and DI premium rates contains worker information (such as age and gender) that
can be aggregated to the level of employers.* Data are also derived from the social security
records, containing information on the DI benefit recipients for various cohorts. This also
includes the flow into the DI programme. We have merged these three administration systems
using employer codes, resulting in a panel data set of about 370,000 employers, employing
roughly 6 million workers. We select employers with at least 10 employees. This reduces our
sample size substantially – about 80 per cent of the employer population is left out – but, in
terms of the number of workers, the loss is only about 20 per cent. Also, note that the data
set does not cover all employers and workers in the Netherlands. Experience-rated premium
rates cannot be calculated for firms that have existed for less than one year, or firms that
have merged or split up recently. This induces some variation in the number of employers
that is observed in the data over time, as well as the number of employees. 
Anticipated incentive effects
In the literature, the identification of incentive effects of experience rating is essentially built
on two assumptions: exogeneity in (marginal) incentive variation; and local linearity of the
incentive system. First, it is assumed that variation in the marginal experience incentive is – at
least to some extent – exogenous. Exogeneity may arise in the case of (inter-state) variation in
the experience-rating systems – such as the unemployment insurance (UI) programmes in the
USA, where the degree of completeness of experience rating varies between states. For the
Netherlands, such an approach is not applicable, as the only institutional variation comes
from the distinction between small employers and medium and large employers. Exogeneity
may also stem from variation in the experience-rating incentive over time for individual firms,
using longitudinal employer data. Identification then follows from movements of employers
along tax or premium schedules.14
Second, the local linearity assumption is needed to ensure that employer decisions are driven
by the current marginal incentive. That is, the incentive the employer is faced with is well
approximated by the slope that determines how the employer’s costs would change in case of
a small one-time increase in DI costs. This requires both the support of the risk distribution
with and the support without the marginal incentive to be sufficiently long. In particular, it
should not be likely that the disability risks of employers move to another part of the support
the following year, causing the marginal incentive to change. 
As for the Dutch DI system of experience rating, one way to assess the effects of anticipated
incentives entails a comparison of employers with equal disability risks but different marginal
incentives. For some part of the support of the disability risks, the marginal incentive is
limited to medium and large employers only, with small employers paying the maximum
premium. This range of disability risks is defined as:
pmax –  pmin <  dit <  pmax –  pmin (3)
* For an extensive description and presentation of the merged data, we refer to the earlier research with
these data.7
70 Koning
with pmin and  pmax denoting the minimum and maximum premiums for employers.* When
assuming the local linearity assumption to hold for (almost all of) the support that is defined in
equation (3), we can estimate the anticipated effect of experience rating by comparing small and
medium-sized/large firms, while controlling for the individual disability risk. We then estimate
the ‘average treatment on the treated’ (ATT), that is, the effect of the experience-rating incentive
on medium and large-sized employers for the distribution support described by equation (3).
Using log-odds specification for the fraction of DI inflow f for employer i at time t, the regression
is then as follows:
ln { fit / 1 – fit }  =  Xit β +  Φ (dit)  +  η I (pmax –  pmin <  dit < pmax –  pmin)  +  εit (4)
where X is a matrix that denotes (time variant) employer-specific characteristics and I is an
indicator function denoting the event between parentheses – that is, the disability risk satisfying
the condition that is defined in equation (3). β is a vector of parameters describing the effect of
X, whereas η denotes the effect of the (anticipated) incentive of experience rating. Φ denotes a
(polynomial) spline function of the disability, so as to control for the disability risk. Finally, ε is a
residual term that is assumed to be independently and identically distributed.
Table 1 reports the coefficient estimates that follow from the Grouped Logit† estimation of
equation (4) on yearly cross-sections of the employer data. Here, it should be noted that pooling
all cross-sections was not possible, as the time window of the disability rate controls was still
increasing up to its maximum of five years during the time period under investigation. This
would render a comparison between disability rates over time impossible.‡ For expositional
reasons, the coefficient estimates of the spline function (with eight polynomial terms for all three
years) are not reported in the table. To start with, it should be noted that there is substantial
variation in the DI inflow rates between sectors, and (employed averaged) age and gender of
workers. This variation is less marked for (employed averaged) wages and employer size. 
As to the incentive effect, we only find a significant and negative impact coefficient for 2002. For
this year, the incentive impact equals about 20 per cent of the DI inflow rate. It may well be that
the relevant interval of disability risks in the indicator function I is too limited to obtain
sufficient employer observations in 2000 and 2001. For instance, in 2000 there were only 175
employers of small firms that constitute the control group on the relevant support. This is also
reflected in the relatively large size of the standard error of the incentive coefficient in that year.
In 2002, however, it seems the support lasted long enough to obtain more efficient – and
significant – estimates of the experience-rating effect. Moreover, the longer support of relevant
disability risks also lends more credence for the local linearity assumption to hold. However,
* From 2000 to 2002, the support increased from 1.96 to 2.80 per cent. For example, in 2002 pmin and pmax
were equal to 1.24 per cent and 6.06 per cent, and pmin and pmax were set at 0.45 per cent and 8.08 per cent.
Thus, the premium range with different marginal incentives for employers with small employer size and those
with medium and large employer size was 4.82% (6.06–1.24) < .. < 7.63% (8.08–0.45). 
† We use Grouped Logit Maximum Likelihood estimation to take account of the discrete nature of the data.
In particular, for any employers have just a handful of employees, causing the likelihood of having no inflow
to be substantial as well. Therefore, estimating equation (4) by standard linear estimation techniques would
yield inconsistent estimation outcomes. 
‡ A similar argument holds for premium rates and their boundary values.
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Table 1
Grouped Logit
estimates on
cross-sectional
data (standard
errors in
parentheses)
Log likelihood 2000 2001 2002
Variable 330625.1 
(n = 5,181,149)
– 379935.3
(n = 5,470,778)
– 352624.8 
(n = 5,462,871)
Constant
Industrial sector
Trade sector
Service industries
Transport 
Catering
Social services/cultural
Semi-public
Financial sector
Temporary employment agencies 
Public sector
Sector unknown
– 5.84 (0.093)
– 0.28 (0.036)
– 0.42 (0.037)
– 0.12 (0.039)
– 0.30 (0.039)
– 0.36 (0.044)
– 0.18 (0.038)
– 0.35 (0.038)
– 0.53 (0.038)
0.18 (0.038) 
– 0.37 (0.043)
– 0.076 (0.058)
– 5.87 (0.080)
– 0.31 (0.035)
– 0.42 (0.035)
– 0.38 (0.038)
– 0.25 (0.038)
– 0.37 (0.043)
– 0.48 (0.037)
– 0.29 (0.036)
– 0.47 (0.037)
0.049 (0.038)
– 0.31 (0.040) 
– 0.11 (0.055)
– 6.34  (0.077)
– 0.25 (0.034)
– 0.34 (0.035)
– 0.51 (0.038)
– 0.22 (0.038)
– 0.40 (0.043)
– 0.48 (0.037)
– 0.42 (0.036)
– 0.39 (0.037)
0.27 (0.038)
– 0.53 (0.042)
– 0.15 (0.055)
Annual salary
10,000–19,999
20,000–29,999
30,000–39,999
40,000–49,999
50,000–59,999
60,000–69,999
≥70,000
0.37 (0.025)
0.40 (0.023)
0.46 (0.023)
0.47 (0.024)
0.47 (0.025)
0.34 (0.028)
0.82 (0.032)
0.23 (0.023)
0.39 (0.021)
0.38 (0.022)
0.38 (0.022)
0.30 (0.023)
0.22 (0.026)
0.32 (0.030)
0.031 (0.024)
0.21 (0.023)
0.11 (0.023)
0.035 (0.024)
0.0060 (0.024)
– 0.11 (0.028)
– 0.0094 (0.032)
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2000 2001 2002
15 < n ≤ 25 0.022 (0.027) 0.037 (0.028) – 0.37 (0.027)
25 < n ≤ 50 0.013 (0.025) 0.048 (0.027) – 0.47 (0.025)
50 < n ≤ 100 0.091 (0.025) 0.12 (0.027) – 0.52 (0.024)
100 < n ≤ 250 0.13 (0.025) 0.18 (0.026) – 0.57 (0.024)
250 < n ≤
1,000
0.13 (0.025) 0.22 (0.026) – 0.53 (0.023)
n > 1,000 0.071 (0.050) 0.25 (0.026) – 0.47 (0.023)
% male,
25–35 
0.95 (0.085) 0.98 (0.085) 1.13 (0.092)
% male,
35–45 
1.40 (0.084) 1.79 (0.081) 1.93 (0.084)
% male,
45–55
1.17 (0.091) 1.89 (0.088) 2.02 (0.089)
% male,
55–65
0.23 (0.14) 0.67 (0.13) 1.68 (0.12)
% female,
15–25 
0.20 (0.092) 0.26 (0.090) 0.56 (0.094)
% female,
25–35 
1.53 (0.074) 1.65 (0.074) 1.77 (0.078)
% female,
35–45 
1.21 (0.097) 1.56 (0.10) 1.98 (0.098)
% female,
45–55
2.10 (0.11) 2.07 (0.10) 1.52 (0.10)
% female,
55–65
0.31 (0.22) 1.22 (0.20) 1.81 (0.18)
Marginal
incentive effect
0.096 (0.065) – 0.081 (0.044) – 0.20 (0.031)
Table 1
Grouped Logit
estimates on
cross-sectional
data (standard
errors in
parentheses)
continued
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it also may well be that the increase in anticipated effects can be explained instead by (initial)
unanticipated incentives. This means that employers have gradually become more aware of
the system of experience rating, thus increasing anticipated effects of experience rating over
time.
Unanticipated incentive effects 
Within the context of the current analysis, unanticipated incentives are defined as the
response to the imposition of premium increases that result from the experience-rating plan.
In a way, estimating such effects can be considered as a test on information imperfections: if
employers are fully aware of the incentive and their DI risks, premium rises would not result
in higher preventive activities that improve the health and safety of workers.  
In the aforementioned analysis, the effects of unanticipated premium rate increases are
analysed, with the same data for the anticipated effects analysis.7 Clearly, simply regressing
the occurrence of a premium raise on the DI inflow rate yields an upward bias on our
parameter of interest. Therefore, a so-called ‘difference-in-differences’ strategy is employed.
This means that we compare changes in the DI inflow rate of employers who have
experienced premium rises with changes in the DI inflow rate of employers who have not
experienced premium rises (so far). As our data only cover three years (2000 to 2002), the
attention is restricted to premium rises in 2001, caused by the DI inflow in 1999. More
specifically, we concentrate on firms that paid the minimum premium in 2000, and
experienced an increase in their individual premium rate in 2001, implying that they no
longer pay the minimum premium. This group is confronted with increases in the premium
rate that are usually far more substantial than any changes in the minimum premium; the
group also receives a separate notice which specifies the disability costs that are passed
through to them. 
When following this difference-in-differences design, the increase in the DI inflow rate of
employers who experienced a rise in their premium rate in 2001 is about 4 per cent lower
than the reference group in 2001, and about 15 per cent lower in 2002 (with a coefficient of
–0.16 (0.021)*). This suggests that the imposition of premium raises has an impact.
Apparently, premium rate increases are unanticipated by employers – making them (more)
aware of the experience-rating incentives, and triggering them to increase preventive activities.
In addition, similar effects of experience rating are found for both the full and the partial DI
scheme, at about 15 per cent after one year. 
These results suggest that employers need a ‘wake-up call’ to pay attention to experience
rating, and subsequently increase preventive activities. This is in line with a behavioural
approach to occupational risks and uncertainty, particularly regarding the perception and
valuation of risks. Regarding the perception of risks, there are three cognitive biases that
cause actions to deviate from the standard economic model: the availability bias, the optimism
bias and the accumulation bias.15† Within the context of the current paper, the availability bias –
stating that humans tend to judge the likelihood of an event by its ease of recall – seems of
* This implies that, comparing 2000 and 2002, the DI inflow probability remained constant for this group.
† The optimism bias states that people tend to underestimate their injury risk compared to the average risk,
whereas the accumulation bias states that people tend to perceive risks in isolation, rather than a sequence of
similar events over a lifetime. 
74 Koning
particular interest. It may be that employers are, to a certain extent, aware of the
experience-rating system, but the risk of worker injuries and premium increases is
underestimated as long as the event has not occurred. Thus, employers will first pay only
little attention to prevention, as they judge this risk to be small. One way to explain this is
by ‘loss aversion’ in the risk perception of employers: they dislike premium increases more
than that they like premium decreases. In the experimental literature, there is strong
evidence for this hypothesis. So far, however, it has not been applied in the context of job-
related risks or experience-rating systems.15
Discussion
The picture that emerges is that the impact of experience rating on DI inflow is substantial,
with most evidence pointing to the presence of unanticipated incentives. Firms have
increased their preventive activities once they have experienced (substantial) increases in
their premium rates. Apparently, they were not well informed, either on the experience-
rating system or on the nature and the size of their disability risk. It is likely that they
responded by lowering the sickness rates in the first two years prior to the claims
assessment, which in turn caused a lower number of DI claimants. 
As to the presence of anticipated incentives, our estimation results are less compelling and
confined to the most recent year in our sample only. This may be due to the empirical
design that is used to track down such effects, with the most reliable (and significant)
results in this particular year. In light of the evidence on unanticipated incentives, it may
also be that the anticipated awareness of experience rating has gradually increased. This
means that there has been a gradual transition from unanticipated to anticipated
incentives.
Our results point to the effectiveness, as well as the limitations, of the current experience-
rating scheme in the Netherlands. Recent work on Dutch survey data underlines the
effectiveness of various measures that have been taken to increase employer incentives –
with experience rating an important one.16 In particular, this work stresses the importance
of various accommodation and rehabilitation activities that employers and occupational
health agencies employ, and of a timely start of such activities during the period of
sickness. The results show that the series of reforms in sickness and disability schemes that
were introduced from 2002 onwards have been quite successful. 
Still, although the potential effects of experience rating were probably substantial, we also
must conclude that the design of the experience-rating system is rather complex. For
policy-makers, care should be taken of the delays in the system, as well as the complexity
of the premium calculation. One may think of the provision of internet services and
software options to calculate the financial consequences of DI costs. This may help to
increase the speed at which employers become aware of the incentives of the experience-
rating system, and behave more like the conventional, standard economic model suggests. 
When taking a more up-to-date and broader perspective on our findings, a potential
downside of the story may be that the reduction in DI inflow rates coincided with
increased UI inflow rates. It may even be that the increased awareness has led employers to
use the non-experienced-rated UI scheme as a substitute pathway to unemployment, just as
the DI scheme was used in the past in reverse direction.5,6 Still, the evidence so far suggests
that this is not the case, as recent research finds the average participation rates of workers
in the Netherlands increased, conditional on their health conditions.17
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Related to this, in recent years the number of unemployed or temporary workers who apply
for DI benefits has increased substantially. In 2009, almost half of the DI inflow consisted of
temporary or unemployed workers, whereas they only constitute 15 per cent of the insured
population.16 It is likely that prevention and reintegration activities were less substantial for
this group with DI costs that were exempted from experience rating, but it also may well be
that more vulnerable worker groups are less able to obtain permanent positions.
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